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Abstract
In a future internet of things, an increasing number of every-day objects
becomes interconnected with each other. Current network solutions are not
designed to connect a large number of co-located devices with different char-
acteristics and network requirements. To cope with increasingly large and
heterogeneous networks, this paper presents an ‘incentive driven’ network-
ing approach that optimizes the network performance by taking into account
the network goals (‘incentives’) of all individual devices. Incentive driven
networking consists of the following steps. First, devices dynamically search
for co-located devices with similar network preferences and hardware and/or
software capabilities. Next, if such devices are found, communities consisting
of interconnected objects with similar network expectations are formed on
an ad-hoc basis. Due to the similarities between the involved devices, it is
easier to optimize the network performance of each individual community.
Finally, different communities can cooperate with each other by activating
and sharing (software or hardware) network resources. The paper describes
which (future) research is needed to realize this vision and illustrates the
concepts with a number of simple algorithms. Through an experimental
proof-of-concept implementation with two networks of resource-constrained
embedded devices, it is shown that even these simple algorithms already re-
sult in improved network performance. Finally, the paper describes a large
number of example use cases that can potentially benefit from our innovative
networking methodology.
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1. Introduction
In the future, an increasing number of objects will be (wirelessly) con-
nected with each other [1, 2]. The rising popularity of wireless car ports,
televisions, radios, rolling shutters and different types of environmental sen-
sors demonstrates that even every-day household objects will come equipped
with (wireless) communication possibilities. Supporting connectivity be-
tween these fixed and mobile objects enables an increased interactivity with
our environment, which in turn enables wireless next-generation applications
such as wireless building automation, automated e-health solutions, interac-
tive museum exhibitions and personalized entertainment systems [3, 4].
Nowadays, supporting connectivity between these co-located devices is
supported by manually grouping together the different devices in separate
subnets based on their network technology. Regardless of the characteristics
of the devices, the same network configuration and network policies are used
for all the devices of a single subnet.
However, this manual approach is complex and inefficient [5].
• Due to the sheer amount of co-located devices, a manual configuration
approach is very time-consuming and expensive, especially in large-
scale networks.
• Manual or static configuration approaches do not take into account dy-
namically changing network requirements such as networks that change
over time, networks that use mobile devices or networks that are formed
spontaneously after impromptu encounters [6].
• Devices from different subnets typically ignore each other, resulting in
harmful interference [7] and missed opportunities for cooperation.
• Finally, current networking approaches most often do not take into
account the heterogeneity of next-generation networks. Different de-
vices typically have (i) different network preferences and (ii) different
hardware and software capabilities [8].
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Figure 1: The characteristics of incentive driven networking.
As such, there is a need for network solutions that efficiently support
at run-time cooperation between devices from different subnets while taking
into account the diverging goals and capabilities of the networked objects.
To fill this gap, this paper presents a networking approach called ‘incentive
driven networking’ that aims to both (i) increase the network performance
of co-located devices through cross-network cooperation and (ii) simplify the
configuration and setup of networks for the end-users.
Incentive driven networking describes a cross-layer, cross-network nego-
tiation methodology for optimizing network resources such as throughput or
latency (Figure 1). Using our methodology, devices (even from different own-
ers) can engage in efficient cooperation with co-located devices that have dif-
ferent network preferences and capabilities, ultimately resulting in an overall
increase in the network performance.
The main goal of this paper is (i) to present and discuss an alternative
networking approach that is better suited for heterogeneous networks and
(ii) to list the research that is needed to realize this vision. The concepts are
illustrated with simple example algorithms that can form the base of future,
more advanced incentive driven solutions. To demonstrate the feasibility
of the methodology several of these illustrative algorithms are implemented
in a proof-of-concept implementation. Finally, the paper will demonstrate
that the use of even these simple algorithms already results in an increased
network performance.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 1 argued that current
networks are not designed to support interconnected objects that differ in
terms of behavior and network requirements. As a possible solution, this
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paper introduces incentive driven networking. Section 2 defines the terms
and concepts that are used in incentive driven networking. Afterwards, Sec-
tion 3 presents the incentive driven methodology that is used to realize the
negotiation based network optimization. The feasibility of the proposed con-
cepts is defended in Section 4, where the performance of an experimental
implementation is evaluated. Next, Section 5 gives an overview of related
network approaches. Afterwards, Section 6 gives an overview of potential
marketable applications that can be realized using the proposed incentive
driven networking concepts. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper.
2. Terminology
Before exploring the methodology, the key components of the cooperation
schemes are described in more detail.
2.1. Incentives
Each device involved in incentive driven networking has a number of well-
defined incentives that describe the preferred high-level network behavior.
An incentive can either (i) describe behavioral aspects of the network (i.e:
‘limit the battery consumption’); or (ii) express the need for additional func-
tionality (i.e: ‘get internet access’); or (iii) give an indication of the expected
performance network metrics (i.e: ‘support video streaming’). Example in-
centives are the following:
• HIGH THROUGHPUT, HIGH RELIABILITY or LOW DELAY (to
obtain better QoS guarantees)
• HIGH NETWORK LIFETIME (to prevent frequent battery replace-
ment)
• HIGH COVERAGE (to reach more clients)
• LOW EXPOSURE (due to health regulations)
• GET PUBLIC ACCESS (to get internet connectivity)
Incentives describe the ‘reasons for cooperation’: devices will only engage
in cooperation with other devices when this cooperation is beneficial for the
incentives of the participating nodes. The incentives of a device are typically
set by the application, or configured manually by a network administrator.
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When devices have multiple incentives, some of these incentives can be con-
tradictory. In this case, devices should indicate which incentives have the
highest priority (see Section 3.3).
2.2. Communities
A community is defined as a set of nodes that have derived common
incentives (‘network goals’). As such, a community describes a set of co-
located nodes that have the same network behavior and the same network
goals: they are similar in terms of capabilities (such as available services) and
incentives. All devices of a single community should be able to communicate
with each other (either directly, or through intermediate devices that are part
of the same community). As an example, the devices of an office building
can be divided into the following three separate communities: Wi-Fi enabled
devices that are battery powered, Wi-Fi enabled devices that are plugged
into a power line and UMTS capable devices.
Devices require a trust relation with all other community members be-
fore joining a community. There exist several approaches to create a trust
relation between devices. Devices that belong to the same owner are im-
plicitly assumed to trust each other. Otherwise, a trust relationship can be
established through the use of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), whereby
a (remote) trusted certification authority (CA) issues digital certificates to
reliable devices [9, 10]. Alternatively, a decentralized trust model can be used
(the ‘web of trust’) whereby devices can vouch for the reliability of other
devices [11]. An example of such a decentralized authentication approach
is PGP [12], a security standard that provides decentralized cryptographic
privacy and authentication for data communication.
2.3. Network services
An incentive can be realized using a large number of networking tech-
niques. For example, the reliability incentive can be improved by using
retransmission schemes, by increasing the transmission power or by using
advanced error correction codes. These optimization techniques, that influ-
ence one or more of the incentives, are called network services. Thus, whereas
incentives indicate network goals, network services are the means to realize
these goals.
Table 1 lists several example network services and their influence on the
incentives. A network service is not crucial for the correct working of the
individual communities, but can be activated or deactivated in a community
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Table 1: Example list of network services and their influence on community incentives (+:
positive influence, -: negative influence, ±: variable or no influence).
depending on the required incentives of the communities. For example, acti-
vating retransmissions will positively influence the reliability, at the cost of
a lower network lifetime.
2.4. Negotiation profiles
To enable negotiation, the characteristics of each community are de-
scribed in negotiation profiles. A negotiation profile should contain at least
the following information.
• A timestamp (time of last update).
• A certificate guaranteeing that the community can be trusted.
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Figure 2: Profiles are constructed in a hierarchical manner. One or more application
profiles are combined in a single device profile. Similarly, a community profile is generated
based on the profiles of all participating devices.
• The community ID and priority.
• A list of incentives and their associated importance for the community.
• A list of available network services.
• A description of the configurable settings (transmission frequencies,
available packet types, etc).
Profile information can be represented using new or existing standardized
XML schemes [13]. Alternatively, resource-constrained networks can utilize
more efficient binary formats to represent the profile information.
Negotiation profiles are constructed in a hierarchical manner (Figure 2).
The incentives of the applications are described in an application profile. If
only a single application is deployed on a device, a direct conversion from
application incentives to device incentives is possible. However, if multiple
applications are deployed on the same device, the application profiles are
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merged into a device profile. In the case of conflicting incentives, different
application priorities can be used to prioritize certain incentives. Similarly,
the community profile represents a merged representation of the device pro-
files of all participating nodes (see Section 3.1).
2.5. Incentive driven networking
For optimal network performance, it is important to make intelligent de-
cisions about which network services should be activated. Since incentives
describe high-level network requirements, an incentive can be improved us-
ing different network services. For example, the incentive ‘reliability’ can
be improved by utilizing better error correction codes, by activating packet
acknowledgments or by using reliable routing protocols. To identify which
set of network services should be activated, it is important to note that a
single network service often influences multiple incentives. For example, the
additional transmissions required for packet acknowledgments influence the
network lifetime of battery-powered devices, and the use of reliable routing
protocols might increase the end-to-end delays.
Incentive driven networking is defined as the selection and activation of
the optimal set of network services in each community with the goal to opti-
mize the incentives of each participating community. Based on this definition,
the distinction between incentives and network services can be understood
as follows: a network service can be activated or deactivated, whereas an
incentive indicates a high-level application or management objective.
3. Incentive driven networking methodology
As stated before, our incentive driven networking approach aims to glob-
ally optimize network resources through negotiation based cross-layer and
cross-network optimizations. Figure 3 gives a general overview of the dis-
cussed incentive driven network methodology. The methodology to support
incentive driven networking consists of the following 5 phases, all of which
will be discussed in more detail:
1. First, communities of similar devices are created.
2. The communities use varying communication technologies to discover
each other.
3. After discovery, the communities negotiate about the optimal set of
network services.
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4. This is followed by the actual activation of the services.
5. Finally, the communities monitor if all services are actually deployed
and if the communities behave correctly.
Phase 1 – 
Community 
Creation 
Phase 2 – 
Community 
Discovery 
Phase 3 – 
Community 
Negotiation 
Phase 4 – 
Enabling of 
Cooperation 
Phase 5 – Policy 
Enforcement 
(at design time  
or at run-time) 
Figure 3: The 5 phases of the incentive driven network methodology
3.1. Phase 1 - Community Creation
Initially, devices are deployed with a simple (standardized) MAC and
routing protocol. They can communicate with co-located devices, but no
network services are yet activated. After deployment of the devices, the
nodes first find out if they can form a community with similar co-located
devices. Joining a community has both benefits and disadvantages for a de-
vice. When a device joins a community, the community incentives might
differ from the incentives of the individual device. In this situation, the com-
munity will optimize towards incentives that are suboptimal for the joining
device. On the other hand, by joining a community, the device enters a
stronger negotiation position, since a community can negotiate on behalf of
a large group of nodes.
The partitioning of devices into separate communities can occur either
at run-time or at design-time. To cope with dynamically changing network
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Algorithm 1 Outline of a simple algorithm for the partitioning the devices
into communities
1: Variables:
2: Pa represents the profile of device a
3: Ca represents the community a is part of.
4: Initial conditions:
5: Ca = {} (each devices is a separate community).
6:
7: whenever
8: A profile Pi is received from another device i
9: Reply with your own profile Pa
10: end
11:
12: repeat
13: Broadcast Pa over all available communication interfaces.
14: From the received replies Pi, select the one that best matches Pa
15: Propose to join community i
16: if community i accepts then
17: P0 ← merge(P0, Pi) (create common community profile)
18: else
19: Ignore Pi from now on
20: end if
21: until No new devices can be added to the communities
conditions, as well as to avoid complex and time-consuming manual network
configuration, a non-manual approach is preferred. The end result of this
phase is a partitioning of the devices into communities of directly connected
devices. As an example, the outline of a simple at run-time partitioning
protocol is presented in Algorithm 1. The algorithm assumes that the in-
centives, services and settings of each community are described using a stan-
dardized community profile, which is transmitted over a predetermined radio
frequency. The algorithm starts when each individual device creates a device
profile based on the requirements of its high-level applications. During the
algorithm, devices search for co-located devices which are similar enough to
be part of the same community. When no more compatible co-located de-
vices are found, the algorithm is finished. In environments that are strongly
heterogeneous, a community might be as small as a single device.
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Of course, alternative approaches are possible. Whichever method is used,
the end-result of this step is that all co-located devices are divided over dif-
ferent communities consisting of devices with similar services and incentives.
Since communities are independent entities, it is now possible to optimize
the performance of each individual community. However, optimizing at this
phase of the methodology might not always be beneficial due to the following
reasons. (i) It is not yet known how the network services will influence the in-
centives of neighboring communities. To cooperate with other networks, the
negotiation output might require that some of these network services are dis-
abled again, thus resulting in unnecessary set-up and configuration overhead.
(ii) Additionally, some optimization techniques complicate the discovery and
negotiation process. For example, utilizing encryption schemes or channel
hopping schemes might prevent different communities from detecting each
other.
As such, depending on the complexity and length of the ‘community
discovery’ and ‘community negotiation’ phases, it can be beneficial to delay
some (or all) network optimizations until after the negotiation process.
3.2. Phase 2 - Community Discovery
In the previous phase, devices were partitioned into separate communities
with similar incentives and services. Now, the different communities find out
if they are co-located with other communities capable of incentive driven
networking. Community discovery consists of the following steps:
1. Assignation of discovery nodes. Each community decides on the opti-
mal number of devices that are needed to detect co-located communi-
ties. To bear minimal impact on the network performance, a subset of
discovery nodes can suffice (see Figure 4).
2. Community discovery. Next, the discovery devices are used to detect
the co-located communities. Community detection can be passive (i.e.:
discovery devices passively scan for recognized packets on multiple fre-
quenties in order to overhear existing communities [14]) or active (i.e.:
by broadcasting community advertisement messages over multiple fre-
quencies containing information about the network settings that should
be used to contact the advertising community). The end result of this
step is that single hop communication between the discovery nodes of
different communities is possible.
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Figure 4: Distributed Commmunity Discovery. a) A subset of the discovery devices is
used for detecting other communities. b) Adding more discovery devices increases the
probability of successful detection. c) Multiple discovery devices can transmit discovery
beacons in parallel on different frequencies to ensure a timely detection of co-located
communities.
3. Profile exchange. Afterwards, the discovered communication settings
are used to exchange the community profiles between the discovery
nodes.
4. Forward the received profile. Finally, received community profiles are
forwarded to the ’negotiation’ entity of each community (see next sec-
tion).
3.3. Phase 3 - Community Negotiation
By now, the co-located communities have exchanged profiles which de-
scribe the incentives of each community. The next steps investigate if coop-
eration between different co-located communities (in the form of activating
cross-network services such as interference avoidance) is beneficial. To be
able to participate in this step of incentive driven networking, each partici-
pating community should have a negotiation entity. This negotiation entity
is either a single, central manager that is trusted by both communities or an
entity that is distributed over several nodes of each community. Negotiation
consists of the following phases:
1. Announcement of negotiation entity. The negotiation entity of each
community regularly announces its presence to all nodes of the com-
munity by broadcasting ’negotiation advertise’ messages.
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2. Collection of community profiles. All received community profiles are
forwarded to the nearest negotiation entity where the negotiation pro-
cess is initialized.
3. Determine an influence rating for each service. For each available net-
work service, the negotiation manager determines how the activation
of the available service will influence the incentives of each community.
For example, enabling aggregation can increase the network lifetime
incentive by 30% [15]. To agree on estimated influence of network ser-
vices, results can be used from (i) existing literature, from (ii) network
simulators or from (iii) network monitoring agents.
4. Calculate optimal set of network services. Based upon these influence
ratios, the negotiation entity calculates the optimal selection of services
that should be activated. In some cases, optimal incentive driven net-
working might require that the communities do not merge, but try to
avoid each other (for example by using interference avoidance mecha-
nisms).
To calculate the optimal set of network services, several negotiation ap-
proaches are possible based on methods such as game theory [16, 17], self-
learning approaches [18] or mathematical formulas. To illustrate the nego-
tiation concepts, this section derives an example negotiation algorithm that
uses a heuristic ILP formulation that can be applied to any number N par-
ticipating networks, using the notations from Table 2.
With:
N = the total number of communities participating in the
negotiation process.
I = the total number of incentives.
S = the total number of available services.
It is assumed that:
I∑
i=0
IWi,a = 1, ∀ a = 0..N (1)
Formula (1) enforces that the sum of the incentive weights of each com-
munity is normalized to one. For example, consider the situation where two
applications are running on node a. One application requires a maximal
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Symbol Meaning
profita The profit function of community a. This objective function
should be maximized for each network to optimally profit
from incentive driven networking.
CPa ‘Community Priority’ of community a. Under normal oper-
ations, the priority of each community equals one. However,
the performance of certified emergency networks can be im-
proved by giving them a higher priority, at the cost of a lower
network performance of the other participating communities.
IWi,a ’Incentive Weight.’ The weight factor that is given to incen-
tive i in community a.
SIi,a;s,b ‘Service Influence’. The percentage by which incentive i from
community a is improved when service s is activated in com-
munity b. These values can be configured at design-time, or
monitoring agents can use learning techniques to intelligently
monitor and change these percentages at run-time.
SAs,a ‘Service Activated’. A binary variable (0 or 1) that indicates
if service s is activated in community a. These variables are
determined as the end result of the linear program.
Table 2: List of variables used during the negotiation process.
throughput, whereas the other requires a long network lifetime. Assum-
ing both applications are equally important, the incentive weights would
be divided equally amongst both applications, resulting in IWthroughput,a =
IWlifetime,a = 0.5. This normalization requirement is introduced to prevent
‘greedy behavior’: devices are not allowed to set the weight factor of all in-
centives to very high values. Devices are forced to prioritize certain incentives
at the cost of other (less important) incentives. This way, devices indicate
that they accept a (potential) degrade of the network incentives that are less
important to them, in exchange for an increase of the incentives that received
the highest weight factors.
Then maximize:
N∑
a=0
CPa ∗ profita (2)
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Subject to:
profita =
I∑
i=0
[
IWi,a ∗
{
1 +
S∑
s=0
N∑
b=0
(SAs,b ∗ SIi,a;s,b
}]
(3)
profita ≥ 1, ∀ a = 0..N (4)
SAs,b =
{
1 if service s is activated in network b;
0 if service s is deactivated in network b.
(5)
The profit of each individual community a is calculated in Formula (3).
The formula evaluates how each service influences the incentives of commu-
nity a when activated. Since initially no services are used (SAs,b = 0,∀s =
0..S,∀b = 0..N) the profit without incentive driven networking equals one.
When new services are added, these services increase or decrease the value of
the incentives (for example: using sleep schemes might improve the ‘network
lifetime incentive’ by 60%). Depending on the weights of the incentives, the
profit function of a community will favor different incentives.
The condition described in Formula (4) ensures that the performance of
none of the participating communities is degraded after cooperation. If no
solution is found that results in better performance for a community a, this
community will not participate in the cooperation. Optionally, condition (4)
can be omitted when a community agrees to accept a decreased performance
(for example to support nearby emergency networks).
Finally, the last condition in Formula (5) indicates that SAs,b are binary
variables. After solving the ILP formulation, the binary variables SA indi-
cate which services should be activated to maximally increase the objective
function of all involved communities.
Finally, based on the description of the network services, additional con-
straints can be added. For example: if a network service needs to be activated
over both communities (such as when using frequency hopping), the condi-
tion SAfreqhop,a = SAfreqhop,b is added. Similarly, if network service a requires
the activation of network service b, the condition SAservice,a ≤ SAservice,b is
added. In case no neighboring communities are found, or if the negotiation
process with the neighboring communities fails, the linear program is used
to optimize the performance of only a single community (by ignoring the
incentive requirements of neighboring communities).
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3.4. Phase 4 - Enabling of the incentive driven cooperation
After selecting the optimal set of services in each community, the next
phase selects and activates the services in all involved communities. In addi-
tion, the settings of both networks are configured such that communication
between the different networks is possible.
1. Propagation of the proposition. The negotiation entity forwards the
decision about the service selection to the discovery nodes of the com-
munity. These devices know how to contact the other communities and
relay the proposition to the co-located communities.
2. Additional negotiation (optional). Depending on the negotiation ap-
proach, the conclusions about the optimal set of services reached by
both communities might differ. In this case, additional negotiation is
required to find a set of services that both communities can agree on.
3. Confirmation and distribution. Once all involved communities agree
on the service selection, the negotiation server distributes the chosen
set of activated services and network settings in both communities.
4. Service migration (optional). It is possible that some devices are not
up-to-date with the latest software components. If this is the case,
these missing or outdated software components must first be installed.
To update devices with new network services at run-time, modular
network stacks can be used [19, 20, 21]. In some cases, it can be possible
to directly exchange network services between different devices.
5. Activate the settings and services. Once both communities have re-
ceived the optimal settings and services, the communities simultane-
ously switch to the selected configuration. It is possible that some
services are activated only for specific packets. For example: a QoS
service can be activated to process only packets that contain real-time
information.
3.5. Phase 5 - Network monitoring and policy enforcement
Finally, communities will want to check if all other communities are ’play-
ing by the rules’, i.e.: are not cheating. For example, a monitoring agent can
be used to (i) investigate if the selected services are actually activated and
performing as expected and (ii) monitor the actual influence ratios of the
activated services. If the set of services changes, or if the measured influ-
ence ratios differ greatly from the influence ratios used in the negotiation
algorithm, a new negotiation process is started.
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Since this phase can re-trigger negotiation, oscillated behavior can oc-
cur whereby negotiation is triggered too often (i.e.: for marginal profits).
Triggering a new negotiation process only makes sense when the expected
(long-term) benefits outweigh the short-term negotiation overhead. As such,
the threshold values that trigger negotiation should be determined as a func-
tion of both (i) the expected network improvement after negotiation (see
Section 3.3) and (ii) the overhead incurred by the negotiation process (see
Section 4.3).
Finally, oscillated behavior can also occur when the estimation algorithm
is too inaccurate (i.e.: the outcome of the profit estimation function before
negotiation differs greatly from the measured network performance after ne-
gotiation). Therefore, if the used estimation algorithm is unreliable, the
devices should either switch to a different profit estimation technique or in-
dicate that they cannot participate in the negotiation process.
4. Proof-of-concept implementation
This section experimentally measures the benefits of incentive driven net-
working. To this end, a proof-of-concept implementation of the coopera-
tion approach was implemented on resource-constrained TMoteSky sensor
nodes [22].
4.1. Experimental setup
B
A
A
Temperature  sensor node (community A)
Intrusion detection sensor node (community B)
A
A
A
A
A
AA
A
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
Sink A
Sink B
Discovery 
devices
Figure 5: The network used in the proof-of-concept demonstrator. Two types of nodes
are deployed: battery-powered temperature monitoring devices (A) and reliable intrusion
detection security nodes (B).
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For our experiments, the iLab.t wireless sensor testbed [23, 24] was used,
which is located in the IBBT - Ghent University office building in Belgium.
Figure 5 shows the location of the TMoteSky nodes.
For the proof-of-concept, temperature monitoring sensor nodes (A) were
installed in multiple different rooms. These devices sent a temperature report
every 10 seconds to the HVAC control unit (‘sink device A’), so that the
heating, ventilation and air conditioning system (HVAC) can be optimized
to reduce its energy consumption. To prevent frequent battery replacements,
the main incentive of these battery-powered nodes is the network lifetime
(IWlifetime;a = 0.7), with reliability as a secondary incentive (IWreliability;a =
0.3).
Due to recent burglaries in the area, the proof-of-concept owner decides
afterwards to also purchase a wireless anti-theft system, to be installed and
operated by an external security firm. Intrusion detection sensor devices
(B) are installed at key locations in the building. Since this network has
a more critical function, these sensor devices are powered by high-capacity
batteries. Every 10 seconds a security report is forwarded to a monitoring
PC (’sink device B’) which can be accessed remotely by the external security
firm. These high-priority information exchanges represent information such
as status updates, intrusion alerts or static images from a webcam. To ensure
a timely reaction in emergency situations, the devices have stringent delay
and reliability incentives (IWdelay;b = 0.5; IWreliability;b = 0.5).
Multi-hop experiments are created by setting the transmission power of
the sensor nodes to an output power of -15 dBm. Using these settings, packets
require maximum 4 hops to be transmitted from one side of the building to
the opposite side. The AODV protocol [25] is used to route all exchanged
packets.
The sensor devices from the proof-of-concept are capable of activating two
types of network services. (i) Activating ‘packet sharing ’ enables devices to
interpret incoming packets from different communities. In addition, packets
can be transmitted to any of the available sinks. (ii) The second network
service is the aggregation service described in [15], which reduces the number
of packet transmissions by aggregating information exchanges from multiple
network layers into a single packet.
4.2. Overhead of the community discovery process
When the communities are deployed, they initially function independent
from each other at different radio frequencies. On each floor, one device of
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Figure 6: Sequence diagram of the community discovery process from the proof-of-concept
demonstrator.
each community was manually assigned the role of discovery device (indicated
on Figure 5). The discovery algorithm is illustrated in Figure 6. The discov-
ery devices send out a COMMUNITY ADVERTISEMENT message every
ADVERTISE INTERVAL time units, which is transmitted sequentially on
all available radio frequencies Fn. Discovery nodes from neighboring com-
munities use the information from the COMMUNITY ADVERTISEMENT
to send an ADVERTISEMENT REPLY using the radio frequency used by
the original discovery node1. Once this connection is established, the COM-
MUNITY PROFILE is exchanged between the discovery nodes.
The total number of packets per time unit (PPT ) required for the dis-
covery process in community C can be calculated as follows.
1A short delay is introduced to give the original node time to finish transmitting its
advertisements over all frequencies.
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PPT (Discovery; Community C) =
(Fn ∗DNC +
DNC∑
j=1
Cj∑
i=1;i 6=C
DNi,j) ∗ 1
ADVC
(6)
+
DNC∑
j=1
∗
Cj∑
i=j;i 6=C
2 ∗DNi,j
ADVi
(7)
With:
DNC = The # of discovery nodes in community C
DNi,j = The # of discovery nodes in community i
that are within reach of discovery node j.
Cj = The # of communities that are in reach of
discovery node j.
ADVC = The advertise interval of community C.
The first part of Formula 6 calculates the total number of advertisement
messages that are transmitted by the discovery nodes of community C per
time unit (Fn ∗ DNCADVC ). The second part of formula 6 calculates the number
of community profiles that are sent in response to advertisement replies from
neighboring discovery nodes. Part 7 of the formula expresses that an adver-
tisement reply and a community profile is transmitted in response to each
community advertisement that is received from a neighboring community.
In the proof-of-concept implementation, the ADVERTISE INTERVAL is
set to 5 minutes, and Fn equals 16 (all available IEEE 802.15.4 channels). Us-
ing these settings, the discovery overhead of our proof-of-concept network is
limited to 3.8 packets per minute. For dynamic networks, the advertisement
interval should be set to a low value, whereas energy constrained networks
or networks that interact rarely would prefer a much higher value to reduce
the energy consumption. In large networks, the overhead of the discovery
process can further be reduced by intelligently choosing the location of the
discovery devices; or by implementing more intelligent discovery algorithms2.
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Figure 7: Sequence diagram of the negotiation process from the proof-of-concept demon-
strator.
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4.3. Overhead of the negotiation process
The negotiation process is illustrated in Figure 7. Whenever the discovery
node receives a new or updated community profile, this profile is forwarded
to the negotiation entity (the sink) of each community. The linear program
from Section 3 is implemented to automatically calculate the optimal set
of network services. The negotiation entity will only calculate new service
proposals if a new profile is detected, or if the profile information of one of
the communities has changed.
After the calculation of the optimal services, service negotiation mes-
sages (in the form of SERVICE PROPOSALS and SERVICE REPLIES)
are exchanged between the negotiation entities to reach a common deci-
sion. Each service negotiation messages includes a transaction ID to keep
track of the negotiation process. The type of the negotiation message (pro-
posal, reply, etc.) is indicated by the negotiation code of the negotiation
message (see Figure 7). Each message type can also include one or more
options. For example, a SERVICE REPLY message can have one of the fol-
lowing options: PROPOSAL ACCEPTED, PROPOSAL REFUSED, PRO-
POSAL COUNTEROFFER. Finally, the list with services and settings may
be omitted from the service negotiation message if they remain unchanged
from the previous message with the same transaction ID.
Finally, once both communities reach an agreement on which network ser-
vices should be activated, a SERVICE DISTRIBUTION message is broad-
cast by the negotiation entities of each community (see Figure 7). These
messages inform the individual devices of each community of the selected set
of services and settings. If settings cannot be activated, a device may respond
with a SERVICE UNAVAILABLE message. If this occurs, the conflicts must
be solved (by installing the missing service, by removing the device from the
community, or by renegotiation) before the SERVICE ACTIVATION mes-
sage can be broadcast. Once every intermediate device has received the
activation message the network settings will be changed.
The overhead for the negotiation process (in number of packets) can be
calculated as follows.
2For example: a discovery node can choose to send only a single reply message if it is
in reach of multiple discovery nodes from the same community.
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Packets(Negotiation; Community C) =
5 ∗
DNC∑
j=1
Cj∑
i=1;i 6=C
Dj (8)
+ 2 ∗ (NodesC − 1) (9)
With:
Dj = The distance (# of hops) from
discovery node j to the negotiation entity.
NodesC = The # of nodes in community C
It is assumed that each discovery node is capable of filtering duplicate
profiles (for example, if the discovery device is in range of multiple discovery
devices of a neighboring community). Formula 8 calculates the number of
packet transmissions between the negotiation entity and the discovery nodes
of the community. Part 9 of the formula adds the service distribution and
service activation overhead.
In the proof-of-concept, Da = 2 and Nodesa = 9. Using the above for-
mulas, the total overhead of a single negotiation round is 26 packets for each
community. Re-negotiation occurs whenever (i) a new neighboring commu-
nity is discovered; (ii) a neighboring community is no longer available for co-
operation; or (iii) the profile of one of the participating communities changes.
To account for failing nodes, the proof-of-concept implementation performs a
new negotiation process once every hour. As such, the negotiation overhead
corresponds to ±2.9 packets per hour for each node. In most scenarios, this
overhead is negligible when compared to the amount of traffic generated by
the application(s).
4.4. Evaluation of the available network services
As mentioned in Section 4.1, two network services are available: a packet
sharing service and an aggregation service. For the negotiation process, infor-
mation about how these network services influence the incentives is required.
Figure 8 describes the influence of activating packet sharing in both commu-
nities. As expected, packet sharing reduces the average number of packet
transmissions because (i) nodes can select more optimal paths and (ii) two
sinks are now available, thereby reducing the average distance to the sink.
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Figure 8: Influence of activating packet sharing on the network performance.
However, whereas community B indeed shows a reduction in the number of
packet transmissions, community A instead shows a small increase in the
number of packet transmissions, even though the two communities have a
very similar topology. This can be explained by the better link quality of
community A, which causes traffic from the intrusion detection community
B to be off-loaded to the temperature monitoring community A. The average
number of hops, the average end-to-end reliability and the average end-to-
end delay are improved in both networks, as expected. The main conclusion
from Figure 8 is that, while it is often easy to predict the general influence
of a network service on the network performance (e.g: positive, negative, ...),
it is sometimes difficult to calculate the exact influence rates for an actual
network deployment.
Finally, the performance of the aggregation service corresponds closely to
the results from [15], and will be discussed in more detail in the next section.
4.5. Performance of the proof-of-concept
To calculate the optimal set of services in the communities, the lin-
ear program from Section 3.3 was implemented. The temperature moni-
toring community A had the following incentives: IWlifetime;a = 0.7 and
IWreliability;a = 0.3. The incentive weights of community B were IWdelay;b =
0.5 and IWreliability;b = 0.5. Based on the influence rates from the previous
section, the negotiation entity concluded that the best network performance
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Figure 9: The average number of hops in communities A and B in the following situations:
without cooperation between the communities, with packet sharing active in both com-
munities, with aggregation active in both communities, and finally with optimal service
selection after negotiation (packet sharing active in A and B, aggregation active in A)
is obtained by: (i) activating the packet sharing service and the aggrega-
tion service in the temperature monitoring community, (ii) activating packet
sharing in the intrusion detection community, and (iii) using the same radio
frequency for both communities.
The network performance for both communities was evaluated in the
following situations: without cooperation between the communities, with
packet sharing active in both communities, with aggregation active in both
communities, and finally with optimal service selection after negotiation
(packet sharing active in A and B, aggregation active in B).
Figure 9 shows the average hops that are required to reach the destina-
tion. Since aggregation does not result in different communication paths,
the aggregation service has no influence on the average number of hops from
the nodes to the sink. The number of hops is important however, as the
number of hops directly influences the number of packet transmissions, the
reliability and the delay of information exchanges, which in turn influence
the incentives of the communities (see below).
The average number of packet transmissions is shown in Figure 10. Acti-
vating aggregation significantly reduces the number of packet transmissions
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Figure 10: The average number of packet transmissions in communities A and B in the
following situations: without cooperation between the communities, with packet sharing
active in both communities, with aggregation active in both communities, and finally with
optimal service selection after negotiation (packet sharing active in A and B, aggregation
active in A)
(by 20-40%). To a lesser amount, activating packet sharing also results in a
lower number of packet transmissions since less hops need to be traversed.
However, it is worth noting the following. Even though both services lower
the number of packet transmissions, the number of packet transmissions after
negotiation (when both services are active at the same time in community
A) is higher than when aggregation is the only active service. The reason
is as follows: since less intermediate hops are used, the opportunities to ag-
gregate information becomes more limited. As such, in situations where the
only incentive is ‘obtaining a high network lifetime’, aggregation should not
be activated together with packet sharing.
The average end-to-end delay is shown in Figure 11. The aggregation
service temporarily stores information in buffers in order to aggregate mul-
tiple information exchanges. As a result, the delay increases significantly up
to a (pre-configured) value of maximum 10 seconds. For this reason, aggre-
gation is not activated in community B which requires low delay incentives.
It is interesting that the delay caused by aggregation is larger when packet
sharing is also activated, since less aggregation opportunities means that the
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Figure 11: The average delay in communities A and B in the following situations: without
cooperation between the communities, with packet sharing active in both communities,
with aggregation active in both communities, and finally with optimal service selection
after negotiation (packet sharing active in A and B, aggregation active in A)
information is stored longer before aggregated packets can be transmitted.
Finally, Figure 12 shows the average end-to-end reliability. Activating the
aggregation service decreases the reliability by about 3%, since a single lost
packet can now result in the loss of multiple information exchanges. In con-
trast, activating packet sharing increases the reliability by almost 10% since
less intermediate packet transmissions are required. The drop in reliability
that results from activating the aggregation service is offset in community A
by activating the packet sharing service in both communities after negotia-
tion (see Figure 12).
To summarize, the performance of both communities after negotiation is
as follows. The packet transmissions and reliability of community A improve
by respectively 7.7% and 2.4%. These improvements correspond closely to
the requested distribution of the incentive weight factors from community
A (that is, improving the network lifetime by twice as much as the relia-
bility). The delay and reliability of community B improve by respectively
14.5% and 11.7%. This distribution matches closely the requested distri-
bution of the incentive weight factors from community B (that is, equally
improving the network lifetime and the reliability). As such, even when only
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Figure 12: The average reliability in communities A and B in the following situations:
without cooperation between the communities, with packet sharing active in both com-
munities, with aggregation active in both communities, and finally with optimal service
selection after negotiation (packet sharing active in A and B, aggregation active in A)
a limited amount of network services are available, communities can improve
the performance of their incentives by negotiating and cooperating with each
other.
4.6. Conclusion of the proof-of-concept
The lessons learned from this proof-of-concept are the following. The
influence of network services can vary strongly, depending on the network
topology and the used communication technologies [26]. In addition, the
influence of network services also varies over time, especially in wireless envi-
ronments [27]. Finally, networks services can behave differently when other
network services are activated at the same time. These facts illustrate that
accurate monitoring and policy enforcement solutions are needed to efficiently
support dynamic network negotiation.
The implemented demonstrator serves to (i) demonstrate the feasibility
of the discovery and negotiation strategies and to (ii) experimentally verify
and measure the benefits of incentive driven cooperation. As shown in this
section, incentive driven networking can result in better network performance
for all participating devices. The gain in performance depends largely on the
28
network topology, the incentives of the devices and the available network ser-
vices. As long as the influence rates give a correct indication of the influence
of the network services, incentive driven networking will always result in a
network performance that is at least as good as having different independent
networks.
5. Related work
This section gives an overview of related network cooperation approaches
that are designed for a closer collaboration between different wireless net-
works and discusses the differences with the presented approach. Figure 13
illustrates several of these related work approaches.
Network planning tools aim to optimize network criteria such as cover-
age or throughput by calculating the optimal placement and transmission
power of devices. Network planning is very efficient in static and predictable
network deployments [28, 29]. However, network planning solutions cannot
be used in networks that (i) dynamically change network topology (such as
ad-hoc networks), (ii) have network requirements that change over time, or
(iii) in mobile environments, such as when portable devices such as PDAs,
body-area-networks and laptops are frequently moved around. Even though
network planning solutions are limited to static networks, planning tools can
be used in combination with incentive driven network methodologies. For
example, existing planning tools can be used to estimate the influence of
network services on the incentives, which can be used as input for the nego-
tiation phase.
The use of a cognitive radio [30, 31] enables devices to autonomously re-
configure their transmission parameters based on the environment in which
they operate. This allows the devices to reuse unused licensed spectrum with-
out interfering with licensed users or to support an always best connected
(ABC) paradigm [32]. When parameters of the higher network layers are
optimized based on changes in the network environment, the term cognitive
networking [33] is used. A cognitive network is capable of perceiving current
network conditions and use this information to plan, learn, and act accord-
ing to end-to-end goals [34]. Both cognitive approaches are focused on the
optimization of a single protocol layer or a single device and do not usually
involve negotiation or cooperation mechanics.
Whereas cognitive networking is designed for parameter optimization, in
cooperative networks multiple devices work together towards reaching specific
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Figure 13: Comparison of incentive driven networking with related work approaches
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goals. For example, in [35] two MAC protocols are presented that use a
relay node to store the packets that failed transmissions in previous time
slots and attempts to retransmit them in an empty time slot. Depending
on the network layer that is optimized, different approaches are possible.
However, barring some exceptions such as [36], most cooperation approaches
have mainly considered one layer at a time.
Opportunistic or delay-tolerant networking [37] can occur when part of
the infrastructure is not fixed but exists of mobile devices or exists in an en-
vironment in which devices often appear and disappear. Data exchanges can
take place using the connection opportunities that arise due to impromptu
encounters with other devices: nodes can forward data from the source to
the destination by using connections with temporary neighbors. Opportu-
nistic Networks enable users to communicate in disconnected environments,
in which islands of connected devices appear, disappear, and reconfigure dy-
namically. Opportunistic networking can be regarded as a special form of
cooperative networking.
Finally, service oriented architectures support automatic discovery of web
services on newly discovered devices. Standards such as OWL-S [38] fa-
cilitate the automation of web service tasks including automated web ser-
vice discovery, execution, interoperation, semantic descriptions, composi-
tion and execution monitoring. Unfortunately, these approaches are not de-
signed to optimize networks at the lower network levels. However, incentive
driven networking shares several concepts with service-oriented architectures
(SOAs) [21].
• Service composability: network services can be combined to reach a
specific goal (i.e: optimize the incentives of the communities).
• Standardized service contract: network services expose a standardized
interface that is used to activate and configure them.
• Service loose coupling: network services can be activated independently
and do not have any dependencies between each other.
• Service abstraction: network services hide their implementation logic,
they only describe how they influence the incentives.
• Service reusability: network services can be reused for several topolo-
gies and communication technologies.
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• Similar to SOAs the service broker from SOAs, a negotiation entity (see
Section 3.3) decides which network services should be activated/deployed
on which devices.
As such, the incentive driven approach could be extended to also include
negotiation about high-level services.
In conclusion, even though many network optimization techniques ex-
ist, they typically have one of the following disadvantages: (i) optimizations
must typically be included at the design phase and thus do not take into
account dynamically changing environments, (ii) existing optimizations are
often limited to optimizations in a single network layer and (iii) most solu-
tions only allow interaction between different independent networks through
translation gateways at fixed locations. In contrast, our approach (i) takes
into account the incentives of each individual device, (ii) is not limited to
a single network layer, (iii) is designed to cope with heterogeneous devices
and (iv) can cross network boundaries that are traditionally fixed. For op-
timal network coexistence, our approach can be combined with some of the
mentioned techniques that are complementary to ours.
6. Commercial opportunities
Finally, it is worth noting that incentive driven networking does not aim
to replace all traditional networking solutions. Networks that have very
stringent reliability and quality-of-service requirements should be deployed
using accurate network planning tools in a static and reliable environment.
However, our methodology offers a complimentary approach suited for ap-
plication domains that cannot efficiently be solved using traditional network
solutions. More specifically, applications that exhibit one or more of the
following characteristics profit most from incentive driven networking.
1. Multi-party applications often benefit from negotiation. When devices
or parties with different network requirements are co-located, the net-
work performance of the individual parties can increase by making
opportunistic use of each others resources.
2. Dynamic applications. That is, applications that deploy a variable
number of devices, are set-up in an ad-hoc fashion without any plan-
ning, or that exhibit a variation in the number of users, traffic flows
and traffic requirements.
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3. Heterogeneous networks. Especially, multiple networks that are co-
located, heterogeneous networks that consist of devices with different
hardware characteristics and capabilities, and heterogeneous services
with different incentives.
4. Applications that engage in, or benefit from, multi-hop behavior such
as mesh networks, wireless sensor networks or ad-hoc networks.
Table 3 describes in more detail several example use cases that exhibit
several of these characteristics.
Type of
interaction
Example use cases Characteristics
Ad-hoc relay
between
persons or
objects
Emergency services: optimize
the coverage of emergency net-
works (such as TETRA) by us-
ing collaboration (shared rout-
ing, power management, auto
channel selection, etc.) between
the ad-hoc networks from differ-
ent emergency services present in
a disaster area. (e.g. the fire
brigade, the police, etc.), as well
as by making opportunistic reuse
of available deployed infrastruc-
tured networks such as corpo-
rate and consumer Wi-Fi access
points.
Multi-party : yes
(forced co-location)
Dynamic: yes
(# nodes, # users,
ad-hoc)
Heterogeneous: yes
(multi-network,
multi-technology,
multi-service)
Multi-hop: yes
(ad-hoc)
Traffic jam: improve network
accessibility in densely popu-
lated situation such as traffic jam
by having individuals connecting
ad-hoc with each other in order
to reach internet or mobile phone
network.
Multi-party : yes
(forced co-location)
Dynamic: yes
(# nodes, # users,
ad-hoc)
Heterogeneous: yes
(multi-network)
Multi-hop: yes (to
circumvent crowded
areas)
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Coexistence of
sensor
networks
Industrial environments: allow
easy configuration and growth of
multiple sensor networks used to
control machinery in a plant en-
vironment by dynamically opti-
mizing radio and routing capabil-
ities across these networks.
Multi-party : no
Dynamic: yes
(# nodes, # users)
Heterogeneous: yes
(multi-network,
multi-service)
Multi-hop: yes
Opportunistic
oﬄoad of
traffic
Telecom oﬄoading : data and
voice traffic from mobile network
can be oﬄoaded to the Wi-Fi
Network when the user is in the
range of a Wi-Fi access point.
Multi-party :
variable
Dynamic: yes
(# users, # traffic)
Heterogeneous: yes
(multi-network,
multi-technology)
Multi-hop: no
BAN monitoring : instead of mo-
bile networks, available Wi-Fi
networks can be used to backhaul
medical information from body
area networks (BAN) in order to
reduce the transmission cost.
Multi-party : yes
(opportunistic)
Dynamic: yes
(# traffic)
Heterogeneous: yes
(multi-network,
multi-technology)
Multi-hop: no
Sharing of
information
and
capabilities
between
vehicles
Vehicle to vehicle: allow the
sharing of sensed information
(e.g. ice detection, break de-
tection, warning of accident) be-
tween vehicles in the near envi-
ronment. Guarantee the reliabil-
ity of transmissions between road
equipment and vehicles by dy-
namically selecting the best radio
configuration between the differ-
ent vehicles and infrastructures.
Multi-party : yes
(opportunistic,
forced co-location)
Dynamic: yes
(# users, # traffic)
Heterogeneous: yes
(multi-service)
Multi-hop: yes
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Smart
dynamic radio
planning
across services
and buildings
Home environment : improve co-
existence of the different wireless
networks present in a home en-
vironment (alarm system, Wi-Fi,
DECT, home automation, ...) by
dynamically optimizing the ra-
dio settings. Allow collaboration
and improve coexistence of the
different wireless networks across
flats or offices in the same build-
ing.
Multi-party : yes
(forced co-location)
Dynamic: yes
(# users, # traffic)
Heterogeneous: yes
(multi-network,
multi-technology,
multi-service)
Multi-hop: no
Temporary
installation of
multi-service
networks
Fairs and festivals: allow easy
setup of ad-hoc festival telecom
infrastructure by minimizing in-
terference and optimizing usage
of resources and coverage. Dy-
namically optimization of Wi-Fi
parameters (channel, power).
Multi-party : yes
(forced co-location)
Dynamic: yes
(# users, # traffic)
Heterogeneous: yes
(multi-network,
multi-technology,
multi-service)
Multi-hop: yes
Construction site: allow connec-
tion sharing across construction
site infrastructure used for se-
curity (typically meshed wireless
network with sensors and cam-
eras) and communication devices
Multi-party : yes
(forced co-location)
Dynamic: yes
(# nodes, # users)
Heterogeneous: yes
(multi-network,
multi-technology,
multi-service)
Multi-hop: yes
Table 3: Example use cases that can benefit from incentive
driven networking.
Based on this (non-exhaustive) overview, it is clear that incentive driven
networking can be used in a wide range of applications.
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7. Research opportunities
Finally, it is clear that each step of the proposed methodology can be
custom-tailored towards a specific application domain. These custom-tailored
implementations can lead to interesting research opportunities or patentable
network algorithms:
• Efficient network discovery algorithms are needed that are capable of
detecting multiple communication technologies.
• Network monitoring algorithms can be developed that are capable of
estimating the (real-time) influence of cross-network services on the
network performance.
• New negotiation approaches can be developed based on game-theory
or machine learning for networks that have more complex network re-
quirements.
• Heterogeneous network discovery can include methods for deducing and
translating the network settings of neighboring communities, such as
the type of MAC protocol, the structure of the supported packet types,
the used routing protocols and the used communication settings.
• New dynamic addressing schemes can be designed that cope with dy-
namically created communities.
As such, our future work will focus on (i) optimizing the current algo-
rithms to cope with more complex and dynamic networks, (ii) designing new
negotiation methods that are suitable for devices that require several incen-
tives to be satisfied at the same time and (ii) comparing the efficiency and
suitability of different types of algorithms and solutions for each step of the
methodology.
8. Conclusion
This paper introduced incentive driven networking: a cross-layer, cross-
network networking approach that supports cooperation between heteroge-
neous networked devices. Incentive driven networking aims to (i) simplify
the configuration and setup of networks for the end-users and (ii) increase
the network performance of co-located devices. Rather than using manually
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configured (and time-consuming) fixed network boundaries, network creation
and negotiation is based on the concept of ‘network incentives’ or ‘device
goals’. The methodology comprises the following steps:
• Devices cluster together with other devices that have similar incentives,
thus forming communities of like-minded, interconnected objects.
• Different communities broadcast their existence to each other.
• The communities exchange profiles which describe their available net-
work services, their incentives and their network settings.
• A negotiation entity determines the optimal set of network services so
that each participating community benefits from cooperation.
• Finally, the selected services are activated, so that the incentives of
each participating community are improved.
Depending on the device incentives, incentive driven networking results in
better use of the scarce spectrum, better scalability, more efficient energy
consumption, lower radio emissions, sharing of service capabilities (such as
GPS, processing power or internet connectivity) and/or better QoS guaran-
tees.
The proposed methodology was validated in the form of a proof-of-concept
implementation. Experimental results showed that the main requirement for
successful negotiation is the accurate estimation of the influence of network
services on the incentives of co-located devices. However, as long as the in-
fluence rates give a correct (broad) indication of the influence of the network
services, incentive driven networking will always result in a network perfor-
mance that is at least as good as having different independent networks.
Indeed, after cooperation, both networks in the proof-of-concept benefited
from cooperation in the form of having better reliability, delay and/or longer
network lifetime.
It is clear that the methodology is not limited to the example proof-
of-concept scenario. In general, networks that exhibit one or more of the
following characteristics are likely to profit from incentive driven network-
ing: (i) multi-user networks, (ii) dynamic networks, (iii) heterogeneous net-
works, and/or (iv) multi-hop networks. To prove this fact, the paper gave
an overview of a large number of potential marketable applications that can
be implemented using our incentive driven cooperation methodology.
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To conclude, the incentive driven networking paradigm is applicable to a
wide range of applications domains and can ultimately lead to an improved
coexistence of co-located networked devices.
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